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PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
U.S. Covsr. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1:
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States
CRIMINAL COURT
NEW YORK COUNTY
People v. Moore1
(decided January 25, 1996)
Defendant, John Moore, was charged with criminal sale of
marihuana in the fourth degree2 and unlawful possession of
marihuana. 3 Moore moved to dismiss the charges in the interest
of justice,4 asserting that the marihuana laws of the State of New
York violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause5 of the
Federal Constitution. 6 The Criminal Court of the City of New
York, New York County, denied defendant's motion to dismiss
1. 167 Misc. 2d 994, 637 N.Y.S.2d 652 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1996).
2. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.40 (McKinney 1989). Section 221.40
provides in pertinent part: "A person is guilty of criminal sale of criminal sale
of marihuana in the fourth degree when he knowingly and unlawfully sells
marihuana except as provided in section 221.35 of this article. . .. " Id.
3. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.05 (McKinney 1989). Section 221.05
provides in pertinent part: "A person is guilty of unlawful possession of
marihuana when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses marihuana .... "
4. Moore, 167 Misc. 2d at 996, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 653. Defendant moved
to dismiss under CPL § 170.40 which enumerates ten factors to be considered
"individually and collectively" in determining dismissal. Id. at 997, 637
N.Y.S.2d at 654-55. See N.Y. CRBI. PROC. LAw § 170.40 (McKinney 1993).
5. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. This section provides: "The
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States." Id.
6. Moore, 167 Misc. 2d at 1002, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
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in the interest of justice on the grounds that the defendant failed
to provide the court with factors that were sufficiently compelling
to warrant such a dismissal. 7  The court also denied the
defendant's constitutional claim, holding that there is no
fundamental constitutional right to possess or sell marihuana. 8
Moore suffered from Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
[hereinafter "AIDS"]. In his motion papers, the defendant
asserted that he had tried all of the conventional methods of
medical treatment in coping with the debilitating disease, but that
these methods failed to alleviate the pain and suffering as
effectively as did marihuana. 9 The defendant believed that his
symptoms of nausea, decreased appetite, chronic pain and
insomnia subsided greatly after the ingestion of marihuana. 10 As
a result of his experimentations, Moore set out on a "mission of
mercy" to help those who similarly suffered by distributing
marihuana to those who requested it for medicinal purposes. 11
As the number of requesters steadily increased, Moore
established a "medical marihuana buyer's club." 12 The "club"
distributed marihuana at wholesale prices to those sufferers who
could provide documentation of their illness. 13
Moore was arrested in Washington Square Park in August 1995
after a police officer observed him selling a bag of marihuana to
a "client." 14  It was later discovered that Moore was in
7. Id., 637 N.Y.S.2d at 657-58.
8. Id. at 1003, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
9. Id. at 996, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
10. Id.
11. Id. Expert testimony offered by the defendant supported the claim that
marihuana has the beneficial effects of suppressing nausea and increasing the
appetite of those suffering from AIDS or those undergoing chemotherapy
treatments, thereby allowing such sufferers to nourish themselves. Id. at 995,
637 N.Y.S.2d at 653-54.
12. Id at 996, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
13. Id. Defendant was neither a physician nor a pharmacist. The court
looked to medical literature that emphasized that the marihuana "must be
administered under appropriate medical supervision." Id. at 998, 637
N.Y.S.2d at 655.
14. Id. at 995-96, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 653-54.
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possession of eight bags of marihuana at the time. 15 Defendant
argued that the court should have granted his motion to dismiss in
the interest of justice because his efforts were part of a "mission
of mercy" to help others who suffered from debilitating medical
conditions. 16  Additionally, the defendant challenged the
constitutionality of the state's marihuana laws 17 arguing that the
privileges and immunities granted to him by the United States
Constitution had been violated. 18
Initially, the court evaluated its power to make a determination
to dismiss the case in the interest of justice. 19 The statute cited
by defendant in his motion papers provided for the dismissal of a
charge if "the existence of some compelling factor,
consideration, or circumstance clearly demonstrat[ed] that
conviction or prosecution of the defendant upon such accusatory
instrument or count would constitute or result in injustice." 20
The court found, through the analysis of each of the factors
enumerated in the statute, 2 1 that there was no compelling factor
to warrant dismissal of the charges in the interest of justice. 22
15. Id. at 996, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1002, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 996, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
20. Id. (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.40(l) (McKinney 1993)).
21. N.Y. CRM. PROC. LAW § 170.40(1). The factors listed in CPL §
170.40 for the court to consider are:
(a) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense;
(b) the extent of harm caused by the offense;
(c) the evidence of guilt, whether admissible or inadmissible at trial;
(d) the history, character and condition of the defendant;
(e) any exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement personnel
in the investigation, arrest and prosecution of the defendant;
(f) the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence
authorized for the offense;
(g) the impact of a dismissal on the safety or welfare of the community;
(h) the impact of a dismissal upon the confidence of the public in the
criminal justice system;
(i) where the court deems it appropriate, the attitude of the complainant
or victim with respect to the motion;
8751997]
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In its decision, the court recognized the limit of its discretion.23
As expressed in the matter of People v. Litman,24 "[a] trial
court's discretion to dismiss in the interest of justice is an
undertaking to be sparingly exercised." 2 5  In support of its
decision to uphold the criminal charges, the Moore court
recognized that although the defendant had no criminal record,
the legislature had statutorily expressed its consideration of the
offense to be "serious." 26  Additionally, the court viewed
defendant's position as a leader of a "medical marihuana buyer's
club," his lack of remorse, his belief that his actions were
morally justified, and his failure to indicate an intent to cease the
activity, as being unjustified. 2 7
(j) any other relevant fact indicating that a judgment of conviction would
serve no useful purpose.
Id.
22. Moore, 167 Misc.2d at 1002, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 657-58.
23. Id. at 996, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
24. 99 A.D.2d 573, 470 N.Y.S.2d 940 (3d Dep't 1984).
25. Id. at 574, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 941 (citing People v. Belkota, 50 A.D.2d
118, 120, 377 N.Y.S.2d 321, 323 (4th Dep't 1975)). Litman involved a wife
who, as office manager of her husband's business, withdrew checks from her
husband's mail in a "carefully contrived scheme to steal." Id. at 574, 470
N.Y.S.2d at 940-41.The court found that, notwithstanding the defendant being
a mother, having a good reputation in the community, and lacking a criminal
record, an "unusual circumstance cr[ying] out for fundamental justice" did not
exist. 1d. at 573-74, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 940-41.
26. Moore, 167 Misc. 2d at 997-98, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 655. Since the
offense under which defendant was charged was punishable by up to one year
imprisonment, it was considered a "serious offense." Id. The penalty
imposed for a particular offense is the relevant factor in determining whether
an offense should be classified as either "serious" or "petty." Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159-62 (1968) (emphasis added). In Duncan,
appellant was convicted of the offense of "simple battery" which carried a
possible punishment of up to two years imprisonment and a $300.00 fine. Id.
at 146. Although Duncan was sentenced to serve only 60 days in the parish
prison and pay a $150.00 fine, the Court found that, because of the punishment
that could have been imposed, such offense should be classified as "serious"
and not "petty" and therefore appellant was entitled to a jury trial. Id. at 161-
62.
27. Moore, 167 Misc. 2d at 998-99, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 655-56. "[W]here
the defendant has undertaken the unprescribed, unlicensed and unsupervised
876 [Vol 13
4
Touro Law Review, Vol. 13 [1997], No. 3, Art. 30
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss3/30
PRIVILEGES AMD IMMUNITIES
After considering the defendant's constitutional claim, the court
found that the claim lacked merit.2 8 In United States v. Maas,29
the District Court for the District of New Jersey found that the
use of marihuana was neither an explicit nor implicit fundamental
right protected by the Constitution. 30 The defendants in Maas
argued that since it is scientifically unresolved as to whether the
effects of marihuana are harmful, under the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments3 1 they cannot be prosecuted for a "victimless
crime."32 The defendants argued that the government must show
a compelling state interest in support of the legislation in order to
infringe upon their fundamental rights. 33 The court disagreed
and failed to find a fundamental right to possess marihuana and,
moreover, determined that the government was not required to
support the challenged legislation with a "compelling state
interest. " 34 The Maas court found that as long as there is a
"rational basis" for the legislation, its constitutionality will be
upheld.35  The rational basis test does not require scientific
certainty, but rather a mere "reasoned justification" by the
distribution of an illegal drug, the Court is reluctant to find a compelling
circumstance warranting dismissal." Id. at 656.
28. Id. at 1002, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
29. 551 F. Supp. 645 (D.N.J. 1982).
30. Id. at 646-47.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The Ninth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Id. U.S.
CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
32. Maas, 551 F. Supp. at 646. In Maas, the defendants were arrested
while aboard a vessel which was allegedly stopped by Coast Guardsmen for a
routine document check when 543 bales of marihuana were discovered
(approximately 13 tons), and confiscated. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 647.
35. Id. (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
(1938)). See United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 352-53 (2d Cir. 1973)
("[c]ourts usually review challenged legislative acts with the understanding that
they are presumed valid and will be so found unless it is shown that the statute
in question bears no rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose.")
1997] 877
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legislation for its decision. 36 The Maas court found a rational
basis for the legislation, and upheld its constitutionality. 37
Furthermore, the court found that the debate over whether
marihuana is or is not harmless is a task for Congress, and
consequently, the court chose not to violate the separation of
powers by interfering. 3 8
It is with this presumption of validity that courts review
challenged legislation. This presumption applies unless the court
finds that there is no rational relationship between the challenged
statute and the legislative purpose. 39  In United States v.
Gaertner,40 the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the
federal marihuana statute under which he was prosecuted.41 The
court upheld the statute by finding that Congress's classification
was rational. 42 The court noted that those cases requiring a
stricter standard "involve an infringement of a right explicitly
enunciated in the Constitution or otherwise recognized as
fundamental. " 4 3 Having determined that there is no fundamental
constitutional right to the possession or use of riarihuana, 44 the
Moore court followed the lead of other courts and was unwilling
to disturb Congress's prohibition of its possession or sale. 45
36. Maas, 551 F. Supp. at 648. The Maas court commented that if the
defendants were able to show the harmlessness of marihuana to its users and
the community, the court would then be able to declare the legislation
unconstitutional. Id. at 647-48.
37. Id. at 648.
38. Id. at 645.
39. Moore, 167 Misc. 2d 994, 1002-03, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
40. 583 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1978).
41. Id. at 312. In Gaertner, the defendant pled "guilty to four counts of
interstate travel to promote a business involving a controlled substance, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952(a)(3), 2; and ple[d] guilty to six counts of
possession of marihuana with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2." Id. at 310.
42. Id. at 312.
43. United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 352 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 831 (1973).
44. Maas, 551 F. Supp. at 646.
45. Moore, 167 Misc. 2d at 1003, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 658. See also People
v. Shepard, 50 N.Y.2d 640, 409 N.E.2d 840, 431 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1980)
holding:
878 [Vol 13
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When confronted with a question of constitutionality
concerning marihuana laws, courts routinely presume that the
challenged legislative acts are valid. This view adopts the
position that until it is proven that marihuana is not harmful to
the person in its ingestion, or to society, the legislative acts are
deemed constitutional and will remain in force. As long as a
rational relationship can be found to exist between the challenged
legislative acts and the intentions of Congress, the acts will not
be declared unconstitutional.
It]he statute now before us represents the current and considered
judgment of an elected Legislature acting on behalf of the people of this
State .... Nothing would be more inappropriate than for us to
prematurely remove marihuana from the Legislature's consideration by
classifying its personal possession as a constututionally protected right.
The sphere within which we may properly declare a legislative act
unconstitutional is extremely limited and clearly does not emcompass
this case.
Id. at 645-46, 409 N.E.2d at 843, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
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